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Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the
Categorical Approach
Evan Tsen Lee

†

For federal public defenders and immigration clinicians,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 23rd decision in Mathis v. Unit1
ed States was cause for celebration. As they had hoped, the
Court strongly reaffirmed its 2013 decision in Descamps v.
2
United States, which had protected the “categorical approach”
to determining which prior convictions qualify for federal sentencing enhancements or negative immigration treatment. In
the vast majority of cases, the categorical approach is favorable
to criminal defendants and immigration petitioners because it
prevents the government from getting incriminating facts into
3
evidence. Emphatic as the Mathis majority’s support for the
categorical approach may be, however, the concurring and dissenting opinions call the approach’s future into serious ques4
tion.
As I wrote in my SCOTUSblog opinion analysis, it was
more than a little surprising that Justices Stephen Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in Mathis after having joined
5
the Descamps majority. “The majority’s approach, I fear, is not
6
practical,” Breyer wrote, joined by Ginsburg. Although he
made a tepid attempt to distinguish Mathis from Descamps,
† Acting Provost & Academic Dean and Professor of Law, UC Hastings
College of the Law. Copright © 2016 by Evan Tsen Lee.
1. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Moncrieffe, 167 F.Supp.3d 383, 406
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (stating that, because of a particular statute’s structure, “the
categorical approach must result in a favorable decision for defendant”).
4. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2258–59
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2259–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Evan Lee, Opinion Analysis: Victory for the “Categorical Approach” in
Immigration and Federal Criminal Sentencing—But for How Long?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
opinion-analysis-victory-for-the-categorical-approach-in-immigration-and
-federal-criminal-sentencing-but-for-how-long.
6. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Breyer may have had second thoughts about the workability of
lower federal courts having to determine when they must use
the unadorned categorical approach, as opposed to when they
may preface the categorical approach with what has come to be
7
known as the “modified categorical approach” (MCA). The simple use of the categorical approach tends to be individualfriendly, whereas the effectively pre-emptive MCA tends to be
government friendly.
Justice Samuel Alito has always opposed the categorical
8
approach, dissenting alone in Descamps, so it was no surprise
that he dissented in Mathis. If Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s dissent
in Mathis is taken to mean that they no longer support the categorical approach (not a given), that would make three votes to
do away with it. The vote for the petitioner in Mathis was five
9
to three, with the swing vote cast by Justice Anthony Kennedy.
If he had voted with the dissenters, the decision below would
have been affirmed by an equally divided Court. Kennedy’s explanation for why he voted with the majority should greatly
alarm supporters of the categorical approach.
According to Kennedy, the precedents clearly supported
10
the decision in Mathis. But he urged Congress to overrule
those precedents, and Mathis itself. “[T]oday’s decision is a
stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results produced by applying an elements based approach to this sentenc11
ing scheme,” he wrote. “[C]ontinued congressional inaction in
the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable
should require this Court to revisit its precedent in an appro12
priate case,” he concluded. Although he stopped short of saying that he would overrule the categorical approach entirely,
rather than simply overrule the Mathis-Descamps method of

7. Id.; see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 (“We have previously approved . . . the ‘modified categorical approach’—when a prior conviction is for
violating a so-called ‘divisible statute.’ That kind of statute sets out one or
more elements of the offense in the alternative . . . .”); Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that when employing the “modified categorical approach,” a court is permitted to consult “the statutory definition,
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented”).
8. Descamps, 135 S. Ct. at 2295–2303 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2243.
10. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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determining when the MCA may be used, it is hard to see as a
practical matter how the Court could do one without doing the
13
other.
Mathis thus raises two questions: First, how likely is the
Court to scrap the categorical approach? Second, assuming that
the Court does not scrap the categorical approach, should the
Court instead scrap the modified categorical approach?
I. PREDICTION MODE: IS THE CATEGORICAL
APPROACH IN TROUBLE?
The categorical approach will be in trouble if either of two
14
scenarios occurs. One scenario occurs if enough Justices decide (A) that the administrative difficulties are irremediable,
and (B) if they attribute those difficulties to the categorical approach rather than to the MCA. The second scenario occurs if
enough Justices decide that the categorical approach results in
an unjustifiable windfall for federal criminal defendants and
immigrants.
These two predictive scenarios correspond to the two leading normative arguments for abolishing the categorical approach, one pragmatic and the other ideological. The pragmatic
argument against the categorical approach is that it is too hard
to apply—that lower federal court judges are completely con15
fused. Justice Kennedy based his concurrence at least in part
on the existence of confusion, and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg cited lack of practicality in their dissent. The ideological
13. This is why I also believe that Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s dissent in
Mathis possibly means they no longer generally support the categorical approach. Both Justices have authored majority opinions in the past cutting into
the categorical approach. See generally Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009)
(Breyer, J.) (applying a circumstance-specific approach rather than a categorical approach to determine which prior convictions qualify as fraud involving at
least $10,000); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.) (applying a circumstance-specific approach rather than a categorical approach to
determine which prior convictions qualify as involving domestic violence).
14. In the lead-up to Descamps, immigration clinicians took their case in
favor of the categorical approach to the law reviews. See, e.g., Alina Das, Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer L. Koh, Whole
Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 257 (2011); Rebecca
A. Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (2008).
15. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 14, at 278 (“[I]n the recidivist sentencing
and immigration contexts . . . the doctrine suffers from incoherence and confusion . . . as the courts struggle to apply the categorical approach.”).
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argument against the categorical approach is that it gives criminal defendants and immigrants an undeserved reprieve from
16
the rightful consequences of their prior convictions. Justice
Alito clearly believes this, and perhaps Justice Kennedy does
too.
Let us consider the first predictive scenario, in which a sufficient number of Justices decides that this area of the law has
become unworkable. The Justices in Mathis disagreed about
whether it is unworkable, and I predict that this disagreement
will persist for some time. The early decisions following Mathis
suggest that lower courts are “getting it,” but the decisions are
17
too few to draw any meaningful conclusions.
It is undoubtedly true that many, perhaps most, federal
judges are confused about this area. (I base this on a combination of formal opinions and informal conversations with judges.)
But it is absolutely critical to see that judges are not confused
about how the categorical approach works. They understand
that, when most federal sentencing and immigration standards
speak of a “conviction,” those standards do not refer to the facts
that underlie the conviction, but rather to the essential elements of the statute of conviction. Judges generally know that
the categorical approach does not permit them to look at the
18
facts. They also generally understand that the application of
the categorical approach to a given conviction under a given
federal statutory standard (sentencing or immigration) is supposed to produce a binary result: either the conviction qualifies
under the relevant standard or it does not. There is no inbetween.
What confuses lower federal court judges is under what
circumstances the modified categorical approach applies. Look16. Cf. Caleb E. Mason & Scott M. Lesowitz, A Rational Post-Booker Proposal for Reform of Federal Sentencing Enhancements for Prior Convictions, 31
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 339, 369 (2011) (stating that the fortuity of the state of conviction has far too great of an impact on whether or not that individual is subjected to sentencing enhancements).
17. See, e.g., Singh v. Att’y Gen., No. 15-2274, 2016 WL 5845692 (3d Cir.
Oct. 6, 2016); Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2016).
18. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (“This question requires us to address a more general issue—whether the sentencing court in
applying § 924(e) must look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, or whether the court may consider other evidence concerning the defendant’s prior crimes. The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that
§ 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying
those convictions.”).
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ing at the facts is a strong occupational proclivity for judges; it’s
what they do. Thus there is a powerful, non-ideological impulse
driving their desire to apply the MCA. Before Descamps, many
lower federal court judges could not have explained the purpose
19
of the MCA. They only knew that it permitted them to look at
the facts, which in most cases led to a conclusion that the individual had engaged in conduct that placed them within the relevant sentencing or immigration standard. Again, it cannot be
sufficiently emphasized that this feels like the essence of “judging”—the application of a legal standard to specific facts, producing a conclusion. But this judicially intuitive view of the
MCA is flatly incorrect. Descamps made clear what the Court
first stated in the path-marking 1990 case of Taylor v. United
20
States: the MCA is used only for the limited purpose of determining under which portion of a statute the prior conviction
21
was obtained. Unless a court can determine which part of a
statute produced a given conviction, it cannot conclusively determine whether the conviction qualifies as, to give a few ex22
amples, a “violent felony” (federal sentencing) or an “aggra23
or “crime involving moral turpitude”
vated felony”
24
(immigration). The MCA is not there to enable the judge to
use the facts to settle the ultimate legal question, which is
whether the conviction qualifies under the relevant standard.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“The categorical and modified categorical frameworks, first outlined by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, establish the rules by
which the government may use prior state convictions to enhance certain federal sentences and to remove certain aliens. In the twenty years since Taylor,
we have struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court’s framework.” (citation omitted)), abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2276 (2013).
20. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
21. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Section 924(e)(2)(B) was found to be unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 16. Section 16(b) has been held unconstitutional by several
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court will hear a case on its constitutionality in the October 2016 term. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. granted, No. 15-1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016); see
also Golicov v. Lynch, No. 16-9530, 2016 WL 4988012 (10th Cir. Sept. 19,
2016); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. VivasCeja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Crimes involving moral turpitude have
been subjected to wide-ranging criticism as well. See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, No.
14-2839, 2016 WL 4468076, at *6 (Posner, J., concurring) (“It is preposterous
that that stale, antiquated, and, worse, meaningless phrase should continue to
be a part of American law.”).
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That always remains a purely legal question, because it is categorical.
Although the MCA’s limited purpose should have been
25
clear long ago, the Court used Descamps to reiterate the
26
point. Descamps therefore constituted a major step forward in
the Court’s MCA jurisprudence. But Descamps effectively shifted the locus of uncertainty from the purpose of the MCA to its
proper occasion. Descamps said that courts must use the MCA
when the underlying statute is “divisible,” and that they may
27
not use it when the statute is “indivisible.” But courts have
28
struggled with figuring which statutes were divisible. In my
view, there were multiple causes for this confusion. First, it
was unclear from Supreme Court opinions whether the litmus
test for divisibility was essential elements or means of commission. The Court has now resolved that confusion in favor of el29
ements. Second, however, it was also unclear how to determine whether a given statutory term constitutes an element or
a means, and that confusion may well continue to a significant
degree after Mathis. Is “elementness,” to coin an ugly term, a
function of the requirement of jury unanimity? Of the requirement of specificity in pleading? Of the structure of the statutory
text (e.g., separate subsections versus enumeration within a
single sentence versus cross-referencing to another statute)?
Third, in the immigration area, at least, the proper applicability of the MCA was grossly distorted by the Attorney General’s
30
decision in a case called In re Silva-Trevino. The decision has

25. In no small part because of cases like Aguila-Montes and In re SilvaTrevino. See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
2011), abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013); In re
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec.
550 (Att’y Gen. 2015).
26. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 (“[T]he modified categorical approach
permits sentencing courts to consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed the
basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.”).
27. Id. at 2281–82.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2015)
(stating that the Court found that the “means/elements distinction . . . was explicitly rejected in Descamps” but that this was a matter of contention between
the circuit courts), overruled by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016).
29. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
30. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550
(Att’y Gen. 2015).
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since been abrogated in light of Descamps, but the damage will
take long to repair.
So, is the categorical approach in trouble? If so, it will not
be because of problems in administering the categorical approach itself. As I have pointed out, the real problem is admin31
istering the MCA, not the categorical approach. But some Justices may believe that the categorical approach cannot stand
without the availability of the MCA. They may well ask how a
court can apply the categorical approach if it cannot first determine which portion of the statute of conviction is involved.
Yet there is a simple response to this: if the government cannot
carry its burden of showing that the conviction satisfies the relevant sentencing or immigration standard, then the conviction
simply does not qualify. Imagine the following rule: in any case
where it is ambiguous which portion of a statute generated the
conviction in question, the conviction simply does not qualify.
In other words, if the conviction’s statutory etiology is unclear
from the face of the pleadings, the conviction does not apply.
That is a perfectly coherent rule. That rule would be easy to
apply.
Of course, such a rule would lead to more convictions being
disqualified than at present, which brings us back to the ideological argument against the categorical approach. Determining whether convictions qualify on a categorical, rather than
factual, basis leads to a “windfall” for federal criminal defend32
ants and immigrants. In a case where a look at the facts clearly indicates that the defendant’s underlying conduct “fits” the
relevant standard, why should the defendant or immigrant escape his just deserts merely because some hypothetical defendant could be convicted under that statute for conduct that
would not fit the standard? The categorical approach judges a
person not on what he did, but on what some imaginary person
might do.

31. It is true that the “least culpable conduct” form of the categorical approach, which is controlling in most sentencing and immigration standards,
has an inherently arbitrary stopping point to it. Under this mode of analysis,
judges must imagine the least culpable conduct that nonetheless violates the
statute of conviction, in order to determine whether it meets the relevant sentencing or immigration standard. But the arbitrariness of the least culpable
conduct test is not what prompted the Court to grant certiorari in Descamps
and Mathis; it was uncertainty about when courts may use the MCA that
drove those decisions.
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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To understand the “windfall” argument more concretely,
let’s look at Mathis itself. Mathis faced a federal mandatory
minimum sentence based on prior convictions in Iowa for “bur33
glary.” The federal generic standard for “burglary” is an unprivileged entry into a fixed structure with the intent to commit
34
a felony therein. To qualify as burglary under federal sentencing law, the entry may not be into anything that moves, such as
35
a car, boat, or plane. The problem in Mathis’s situation was
that the Iowa burglary statute includes cars, boats, and
36
planes. A person can be convicted of burglary in Iowa for
breaking into a car with the intent to commit a felony therein.
So, did Mathis’s “burglary” convictions qualify?
“How could they not qualify?” asked the federal prosecutor.
The record clearly indicated that Mathis had broken into build37
ings, not cars or boats. The lower courts agreed, saying that
the MCA applied to the Iowa burglary statute whether “vehicles” was an essential element or merely a means of commis38
sion. It was this lower court holding that the Supreme Court
reversed in Mathis, reiterating the point made in its precedents, that the MCA only applies where the statutory term in
issue is an element, and not if it is merely a means of commis39
sion. Mathis, therefore, escaped a mandatory minimum sentence on the technicality that Iowa law treats the places of burglaries as means rather than elements, which surely has
nothing to do with his dangerousness, his moral desert, or anything else connected to the facts of his situation. It thus feels
like a windfall. This was the main point of Justice Alito’s dissent and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Mathis.
The remainder of this Essay will be devoted to showing
why the windfall argument is mistaken. To (sort of) keep my
promise of a prediction, though, I think the categorical approach is one of the many doctrines whose fate turns on the
Justice appointed by President-elect Trump. I count Alito as a
sure vote to overrule the categorical approach based on the
windfall rationale. His dissenting opinions in Mathis and
33. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2015), overruled by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
34. Id. at 1072.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 1074.
37. Id. at 1073.
38. Id.
39. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016).
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Descamps leave little doubt about that. I view Kennedy as the
next most likely to vote for overruling the categorical approach.
I would rate Breyer and Ginsburg as slightly more likely than
not to overrule the categorical approach, but their views may be
complicated by the possibility of other ways of applying the
MCA. Thomas, Kagan, and Sotomayor would seem to be sure
votes to retain the categorical approach—Thomas on Sixth
40
Amendment grounds, Kagan and Sotomayor based on stare
decisis. (Kagan and Sotomayor may also be sympathetic to the
categorical approach because it abates some of the harshness of
the INA.) Roberts is a shaky vote to retain the categorical approach; if I had to guess, I think he would be swayed by stare
41
decisis. That would leave it up to Justice Scalia’s replacement,
so I shall go no further with my prediction.
II. NORMATIVE MODE: ABOLISH THE MCA
Even if Mathis does not clear up the confusion over when
the modified categorical approach may be applied, the correct
remedy is not to abolish the categorical approach. The correct
remedy is to abolish the modified categorical approach. The latter exists because a court cannot apply the categorical approach
to a prior conviction unless it can ascertain what the conviction
was for. In Mathis, the conviction was for burglary in Iowa,
which could be an intrusion into a house, car, boat, or plane to
42
commit a crime. Yet under the ACCA, “burglary” only includes
intrusion into a fixed structure. Thus, the lower federal courts
43
used the modified categorical approach to “peek” at the facts,

40. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563–73 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
41. Justice Scalia was an adamant defender of the categorical approach.
See Andrea Sáenz, Justice Scalia’s Crimmigration Legacy, CRIMMIGRATION
(Feb. 16, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2016/02/16/justice-scalias
-crimmigration-legacy (“Scalia was an extremely reliable vote for the ‘categorical approach’ . . . .”).
42. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1073.
43. See Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 474 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“Descamps permits us to peek at the Shepard documents in order
to determine which approach to use. If those documents show that a statutory
term was an element of the offense, we may employ the modified categorical
approach and use the documents to determine whether a defendant committed
a state crime falling within the ambit of the relevant federal statute. But if the
Shepard documents instead show that the statutory alternative was simply a
means of committing the offense, then we are not permitted to further use
those documents to determine whether the defendant in fact committed an offense falling within the federal definition.”).
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which showed that Mathis had intruded into houses, not cars,
boats, or planes—and thus they upheld Mathis’ mandatory
44
minimum sentence.
The Mathis majority ultimately held that the lower federal
courts should not have used the modified categorical approach
because, under Iowa case law, the place of a burglary is not an
essential element but merely a means of committing an ele45
ment. For the moment, however, the critical point is simply
that none of this would matter if the Court were simply to abolish the modified categorical approach. The Court could simply
adopt the following rule, foreshadowed above: in any given case
where it is not possible to determine which portion of a statute
gave rise to a conviction, the conviction may not be used to support an enhanced sentence or a negative immigration consequence. In other words, under my proposed rule, where a court
cannot apply the categorical approach without first accessing
the modified categorical approach, the case is at an end. The
government loses.
How can I say so casually that the government should lose
such a case? In the vast majority of these sentencing enhancement and immigration cases, the prior conviction factually
qualifies under the relevant standard. Yet to view these results
as a windfall is to lose perspective entirely. Every prior conviction has already been punished—an undeniable fact that is effectively obscured by the wholesale judicial acceptance of the
anti-recidivist agenda. I understand that for reasons of historical accident and administrative pragmatism, the Court has
long held that it does not violate double jeopardy for government to enhance criminal sentences based on the fact of a prior
46
conviction. A fortiori, it is not unconstitutional for the United
States to deport someone for a prior conviction, even though the
person has already been punished for it. I will not here attempt
to mount a full case for the unconstitutionality of using prior
44. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1073.
45. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016).
46. Witte v. United States 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (“In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges
because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense ‘is not to be
viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’
but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to
be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’” (citing Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967);
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677
(1895).
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convictions to support secondary punishments, but I will
strongly assert that this practice awards a windfall to the government. How does one explain to the average American that,
after he has served his full punishment for a conviction, he can
be given two times, or three times, or even ten times the normal sentence for some future crime based on the same conviction? How does one explain that this is not “double punishment” and therefore does not constitute double jeopardy?
Suppose a person committed a burglary and was given a
suspended sentence, serving no prison time. Further suppose
that, within the period of probation, he commits another burglary. No one has a problem with him being made to serve a
full sentence under those circumstances. Now suppose he commits a petty theft after the probationary period for the burglary
has lapsed. May he be made to serve the original sentence for
the burglary? Clearly not; that would be double jeopardy. Then
why may he be given a long sentence for the petty theft—
perhaps even more severe than the sentence for the original
burglary—on the ground that he had a prior conviction for burglary? It will not do simply to say that he is not being punished
for the burglary, but rather for being a “repeat offender,” when
(in this case) his repeat offender status stems solely from the
burglary. From a logical standpoint, this is bootstrapping of the
worst kind. This is every bit as difficult for the layperson to understand as it is for a layperson to understand that not all
“burglaries” are “burglary,” or to say that the burglary of a
house cannot be legally treated as the burglary of a house if it
was achieved under a statute that also covers the burglaries of
cars and boats.
This, finally, brings us back to what appears to be the real
reason that the categorical approach seems to be losing favor
on the Court. Some of the Justices (Alito and Kennedy, at least)
48
think that it gives defendants and immigrants a windfall. But
this is mistaken. If one insists on using the language of moral
desert here, the categorical approach deprives the government
47. Such an argument may be grounded in the fact that the distinction
between increased sentences as mere “enhancements” rather than “additional
punishments” “ceases to make sense as the length of recidivism enhancements
increases to the point where the triggering conduct cannot support the severity of the sentence.” Nathan H. Seltzer, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83
B.U. L. REV. 921, 935 (2003).
48. See Descamps v. United States 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2295–2303 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
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of its windfall. The government’s windfall under current law is
being allowed to impose multiple punishments for the same
crime.
The precedents, of course, say otherwise. Courts have consistently rejected constitutional challenges to sentencing en49
hancements based on prior convictions. More specifically, they
have rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory mini50
mums based on prior convictions. This would seem to follow
logically from the Supreme Court’s holding that it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause for a legislature to impose
51
multiple punishments for a single crime. The only way that
the Court could get to these conclusions was for it essentially to
treat the Double Jeopardy Clause as only prohibiting multiple
prosecutions for the same crime, and not multiple punishments.
And that is, in reality, what the Court has done.
Carissa Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick have made
a compelling argument that, correctly interpreted, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits sentencing enhancements based on
52
prior convictions. “[T]he right against double jeopardy ought
to limit the government’s ability to increase punishments for
53
recidivists,” they assert. “At the core of the prohibition on
double jeopardy is a limitation on the government’s ability to
impose repeated punishment against one individual for a single
54
offense.” They demonstrate that the rhetoric of Supreme
Court decisions has supported the notion that double jeopardy
includes multiple punishments, not just multiple prosecu-

49. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); see also Parke v. Raley, 506
U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“[W]e have repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes ‘against
contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with double
jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal
protection, and privileges and immunities.’” (citations omitted)); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (holding that double jeopardy principles
do not pose a barrier to imposing a greater sentence on reconviction).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.
2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1000 (2000) (“[E]very circuit to consider the issue
has held that [ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence] is neither disproportionate . . . nor cruel and unusual punishment.”).
51. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
52. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a
Limit On Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2011).
53. Id. at 46.
54. Id. at 47. A previous commentator noted, “Tension undoubtedly exists
between recidivist statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Seltzer, supra
note 47, at 946.
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tions. They further demonstrate, however, that the Court has
subtly but surely shifted to an understanding of double jeop56
ardy that includes only multiple prosecutions. This shift was
in large part a judicial response to the perceived societal need
for recidivist punishments in the face of increased crime.
This is not the place for a full review of the merit in the
57
Hessicks’ claim. All matters of constitutional interpretation
call for a full exposition of textual, historical, and precedential
materials. (Although, in my view, the Hessicks do demonstrate
convincingly that history alone does not preordain a finding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause covers only multiple prosecu58
tions.) I will confine my analysis to the “windfall” claim that
Justice Alito, and perhaps Justice Kennedy, advance as against
the categorical approach. In short, my argument is that the
constitutionally and morally suspect status of punishment
based on prior convictions negates the windfall argument
against the categorical approach, and therefore that the decision of whether to abrogate or retain the approach should turn
on pragmatic rather than moral considerations.
If one believes, as I do, that it is at least questionable
whether the government should be constitutionally and morally
permitted to punish a person more than once for the same
crime—with subsequent punishment often much more severe
59
than the original one —then the government has no moral

55. Justices Scalia and Thomas have called for the Court to openly reject
the idea that the clause covers multiple punishments based on the textualist
claim that “jeopardy” denotes only the harm of having to defend serial prosecution rather than the harm of serial penal coercion. See Dep’t of Revenue of
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804–05 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 52, at 49 (noting a “modern shift in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause as primarily a prohibition on multiple
prosecutions rather than also as a robust prohibition on multiple punishments”).
57. Some eminent scholars have disagreed with the proposition that double jeopardy covers multiple punishments. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, An
Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827.
58. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 52, at 49.
59. Michael R. Schechter, Note, Sentencing Enhancements Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Punishment Without Proof, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 653, 654 (1992) (“For instance, a sentencing guideline might
force a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence from five years to ten years
once the prosecution showed that the defendant used an uzi instead of a
switchblade during an assault.”). Of course, in the case of immigration cases,
the results can be devastating. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922) (deportation “may result . . . in loss of both property and life, or of all
that makes life worth living”); see also Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo, Note, Con-
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standing to claim that the categorical approach results in a
60
windfall to criminal defendants and immigrants. It is true
that someone in the position of Mathis benefits from the categorical approach’s focus on the acts of hypothetical actors rather than on his own acts. Mathis ultimately escaped a severe
mandatory minimum sentence because the Iowa burglary statute can be used to prosecute people who break into cars and
boats, even though Mathis himself unquestionably broke into
fixed structures. But this is only an undeserved moral windfall
if one accepts the underlying moral premise that Mathis, who
was already punished for his burglaries, should be punished
again, and much more severely. If the community’s moral compass suggests that people should be punished on the basis of
their own acts and not those of hypothetical actors, then I
would strenuously argue that it also holds that people should
not be punished twice for the same crime. The metaphor of social contract is often invoked, in literature and political dialogue, to recognize that a person who has “paid his debt to society” by serving out his punishment should be treated like
anyone else. The notion of punishing for prior convictions is
akin to saying that a debtor can be made to pay the same debt
over and over again.
To be sure, moral analysis resists precise calibration. But it
is critical to see that this moral claim against recidivist punishment is, in this situation, a moral counterclaim. The claim
that criminal defendants and immigrants often receive a “windfall” from categorical analysis is a moral claim. It is certainly
not based on positive law—quite the contrary, since categorical
analysis is the law. It can perhaps be recast as some kind of
specious claim about “legislative intent,” as in, “surely Congress cannot have wanted defendants and immigrants with
prior convictions to escape sentencing enhancements and removal based on what hypothetical actors might have done.” But
this will not do, as it can just as easily be argued that “surely
Congress cannot have wanted people to be punished multiple

sequences Too Harsh for Noncitizens Convicted of Aggravated Felonies?, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1173, 1187–88 (detailing the harsh consequences for immigrants who have been convicted of an aggravated felony).
60. In terms of whether negative immigration consequences constitute
“punishment,” I follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (“Deportation proceedings technically are not criminal; but practically they are for they extend the criminal process of sentencing
to include on the same convictions an additional punishment of deportation.”).
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times for the same crime even when it is not clear that their
prior convictions qualify under the relevant statutes.”
This brings us to my ultimate argument. The MCA allows
multiple punishment even when it is not clear that their prior
convictions qualify. If the “divisibility” test of Descamps and
Mathis does not succeed in clearing matters up, then the MCA
will be used in some cases where the statutes are indivisible,
which is illegal. If one does not believe that the test of divisibility can be administered successfully, then the proper remedy is
to abrogate the MCA, not the categorical approach. The categorical approach is easy to apply, and it does not lead to a net
moral windfall for anyone. The MCA, on the other hand, leads
to some cases where people are being illegally punished for the
same crime twice because courts are confused about whether
statutes are divisible or indivisible. Time will tell whether the
divisibility jurisprudence of Descamps and Mathis is working,
as a practical matter. If it works, then the status quo should
stand. If it does not, then the MCA should be overruled. The result—that fewer people will be punished twice for the same
crime—is something American society can live with.

